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The paper revisits the long-standing question of the impact of trade
openness on the inﬂation–output trade-off by accounting for the
effects of product market competition on price ﬂexibility. The study
develops a New-Keynesian open-economy dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model with non-constant price elasticity of
demand and Calvo price setting in which the frequency of price ad-
justment is endogenously determined. It demonstrates that trade
openness has two opposing effects on the sensitivity of inﬂation to
output ﬂuctuations. On the one hand, it raises strategic comple-
mentarity in ﬁrms’ pricing decisions and the degree of real price
rigidities, which makes inﬂation less responsive to changes in real
marginal cost. On the other hand, it strengthens ﬁrms’ incentives
to adjust their prices, thereby reducing the degree of nominal price
rigidities and increasing the sensitivity of inﬂation to changes inmar-
ginal cost. The study explains the positive relationship between
competition and the frequency of price adjustment observed in the
data. It also provides new insights into the effects of global eco-
nomic integration on the Phillips Curve.
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access article under the CC BY license (http://
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1. Introduction
The substantial increase in global economic integration during recent decades initiated a heated
debate on the impact of trade openness on inﬂation and the short-run inﬂation–output trade-off. As
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understanding this impact is of crucial importance for the optimal design and conduct of monetary
policy, the topic has attracted signiﬁcant interest not only among academics but also policy makers.1
One of the key determinants of the sensitivity of inﬂation to changes in domestic economic activity
is the degree of nominal price rigidities, which depends on the frequency with which ﬁrms change
their prices. Previous studies analysing the effects of trade integration on inﬂation with the use of struc-
tural macroeconomic models have assumed that the frequency of price adjustment is constant and
have therefore ignored the fact that changes in the openness of the economy and the resulting changes
in competition may affect ﬁrms’ pricing policies. This is an important omission as surveys of ﬁrms’
price-setting behaviour as well as empirical studies based on disaggregated price data provide strong
evidence of a positive relationship between the level of competition and the frequency of price changes.2
This study ﬁlls this gap by examining, within a New-Keynesian open-economy model, the impact of
trade openness and product market competition on price ﬂexibility and their implications for inﬂa-
tion dynamics.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, the study provides new insights into the deter-
minants of real and nominal price rigidities and, in particular, it explains the positive relationship between
competition and the frequency of price adjustment observed in the data. Second, by accounting for
the impact of competition on ﬁrms’ price-setting behaviour, it sheds new light on the effects of trade
openness on the Phillips Curve and the inﬂation–output trade-off.
For the purpose of the analysis, the paper develops a New-Keynesian DSGE model which builds
on the open-economy framework with staggered price setting developed by Clarida et al. (2002) and
Galí and Monacelli (2005). In order to capture the effects of competition on ﬁrms’ pricing policies,
the proposed model departs from two standard assumptions used in New-Keynesian open-economy
general equilibrium models. First, in place of the usual Dixit–Stiglitz consumption aggregator imply-
ing constant elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods, the model introduces an extension
of the consumption aggregator suggested by Kimball (1995) to an open-economy environment with
a variable number of traded goods. The consumption aggregator is characterised by non-constant price
elasticity of demand, which generates strategic complementarity in ﬁrms’ price-setting decisions in
that a ﬁrm’s optimal price depends positively on the prices charged by its competitors. It also ac-
counts for the negative impact of trade openness on ﬁrms’ steady-state mark-ups.3 Second, the frequency
of price adjustment is endogenised. Firms set their prices as in Calvo (1983); however, the probabil-
ity of a price change in a given period is not exogenous, as is usually assumed, but is subject to ﬁrms’
optimising decisions.4
In the framework developed, the level of competition is deﬁned as the total number of varieties
available to domestic consumers. Trade integration, associated with an increase in the number of im-
ported varieties, leads to a higher level of competition faced by ﬁrms.5 The level of competition affects
the steady-state price elasticity of demand and desired mark-ups, which in turn determine the degree
of strategic complementarity in ﬁrms’ price-setting decisions and ﬁrms’ incentives to adjust their prices.
The analysis demonstrates that trade openness has two opposing effects on ﬁrms’ optimal pricing
and inﬂation. On the one hand, greater trade integration and competition increases strategic comple-
mentarity in ﬁrms’ price-setting decisions and the degree of real price rigidities, which makes inﬂation
less sensitive to changes in domestic economic conditions. On the other hand, stronger competitive
pressure raises the opportunity cost of not adjusting prices and leads to more frequent price adjust-
ment, reducing nominal price rigidities andmaking inﬂationmore sensitive to shocks. The overall impact
1 See speeches by Kohn (2006), Bean (2006), Bernanke (2007), Fukui (2007) and Trichet (2008).
2 Surveys of the literature on the link between competition and the frequency of price adjustment can be found in Carlton
(1989), Asplund and Friberg (1998) and Álvarez et al. (2006).
3 The negative effect of trade openness on mark-ups has been documented by Chen et al. (2009), Konings and Vandenbussche
(2005), Beccarello (1996) and Katics and Petersen (1994). See also Tybout (2003) for further references.
4 A similar approach has been used by Romer (1990), Devereux and Yetman (2002), Levin and Yun (2007), Kimura and Kurozumi
(2010) and Senay and Sutherland (2014) to study other determinants of the frequency of price adjustment, while Devereux
and Yetman (2010) have applied it to examine the determinants of exchange rate pass-through.
5 Empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of traded varieties has been an important feature of recent
global economic integration (Broda and Weinstein, 2006; Galstyan and Lane, 2008).
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of these changes on the short-run trade-off between output and inﬂation depends on the initial level
of competition and openness of the economy. This paper therefore helps explain the fact that empir-
ical studies fail to ﬁnd a robust relationship between trade openness and the inﬂation–output trade-off.6
In the presence of strategic complementarity in ﬁrms’ price-setting decisions, domestic inﬂation
depends on two factors: real marginal cost and the relative price of domestic and imported goods.
The ratio of domestic to import prices inﬂuences the prices charged by domestic ﬁrms in addition to
its impact through the marginal cost channel as it affects ﬁrms’ price elasticity of demand and their
desired mark-ups. Trade openness affects the sensitivity of inﬂation to both the marginal cost and the
relative international prices. An increase in trade integration and in the number of varieties available
in the domestic market raises ﬁrms’ steady-state price elasticity of demand and lowers their desired
mark-ups. It also increases the sensitivity of a ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximising price to the prices charged by
its competitors. This has two implications for ﬁrms’ price setting decisions. First, in amore open economy
it is costlier for ﬁrms adjusting their prices in a given period to deviate from the prices charged by
ﬁrms not adjusting their prices. In consequence, following any changes in real marginal cost, they adjust
prices by a lesser amount. This increase in real price rigidity results in inﬂation becoming less re-
sponsive to changes in domestic economic conditions and a ﬂattening of the Phillips Curve. Second,
as in a more open economy the opportunity cost of any given deviation of a ﬁrm’s price from the proﬁt-
maximising price increases, ﬁrms adjust their prices more frequently. This in turn increases the
responsiveness of inﬂation to changes in marginal cost andmakes the Phillips Curve steeper. The overall
effect of trade openness on the relationship between real marginal cost and inﬂation and the slope
of the Phillips Curve is therefore ambiguous. At the same time, trade integration has a positive impact
on the sensitivity of inﬂation to the relative price of domestic and imported goods. As the number of
imported varieties in the domestic economy increases, prices charged by foreign competitors become
more important in determining the optimal price of domestic ﬁrms and, in consequence, domestic
inﬂation becomes more sensitive to changes in relative international prices.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature and how
this paper contributes to it. Section 3 sets out the baseline version of the model developed for the
purpose of this analysis, in which the frequency of price adjustment is assumed to be exogenous. Section
4 discusses the calibration of the model parameters. Section 5 analyses the impact of competition on
the degree of real price rigidities and the Phillips Curve. In Section 6, the baseline model is extended
by endogenising the frequency of price adjustment. The impact of competition and other structural
features of the economy on the optimal frequency of price adjustment is then analysed and the overall
effect of trade openness on inﬂation is discussed. Section 7 concludes and suggests avenues for further
research.
2. Related literature
Since the seminal paper by Romer (1993), the question of the impact of trade openness on inﬂa-
tion and the inﬂation–output trade-off has received much attention in macroeconomic literature. The
results of this research are far from conclusive.7 Empirical and theoretical studies identiﬁed a number
of factors which affect the relationship between trade openness and the sensitivity of inﬂation to output
ﬂuctuations. They include goods- and labour-market structures (Bowdler and Nunziata, 2010; Daniels
and VanHoose, 2006), political regime (Caporale and Caporale, 2008), exchange rate regime (Bowdler,
2009), trade costs (Cavelaars, 2009), capital mobility (Daniels and VanHoose, 2009), the importance
of imported commodities in production (Pickering and Valle, 2012) and exchange rate pass-through
(Daniels and VanHoose, 2013). This paper contributes to this research by accounting for the impact
of trade openness and the resulting changes in product market competition on price ﬂexibility within
a micro-founded New-Keynesian open-economy DSGE model. It shows that as trade openness has
6 E.g. Temple (2002) ﬁnds little evidence for a correlation between openness and the inﬂation–output trade-off. Daniels et al.
(2005) report a negative impact of trade openness on the relationship between output and inﬂation, while Bowdler (2009)
demonstrates a positive effect.
7 See Daniels et al. (2015) and Badinger (2009) for recent surveys of the literature.
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opposing effects on the degree of real and nominal price rigidities, its impact on the inﬂation–output
trade-off is theoretically ambiguous and it depends on the initial level of openness and competition
in the economy.
In the New-Keynesian framework, the sensitivity of domestic inﬂation to changes in domestic eco-
nomic activity depends on two factors: the elasticity of inﬂation with regard to real marginal cost and
the sensitivity of real marginal cost to changes in the output gap. The elasticity of inﬂation with regard
to real marginal cost in turn depends on the frequency of price adjustment, which reﬂects the degree
of nominal price rigidity, and on the responsiveness of ﬁrms’ proﬁt-maximising price to changes in
real marginal cost, which is determined by the degree of real price rigidity. Previous studies exam-
ining the effects of trade openness on the inﬂation–output trade-off based on structural macroeconomic
models with staggered price setting focus either on the impact of trade integration on the sensitivity
of marginal cost to the output gap (e.g. Binyamini and Razin, 2008; Galí and Monacelli, 2005; Pickering
and Valle, 2012; Woodford, 2010) or on its effects on the responsiveness of ﬁrms’ optimal price to
changes in marginal cost and the associated real price rigidity (Benigno and Faia, 2010; Guerrieri et al.,
2010; Sbordone, 2010). This study is the ﬁrst to explore the inﬂuence of trade integration and the re-
sulting changes in competition on the frequency with which ﬁrms change their prices.8
The ﬁrst part of the paper examines the effects of trade openness and product market competi-
tion on the degree of real price rigidities. This relationship has previously been investigated by Sbordone
(2010), Guerrieri et al. (2010) and Benigno and Faia (2010). However, this paper is the ﬁrst to analyse
it within a general equilibrium framework. There are also other important differences. In both Sbordone
(2010) and Guerrieri et al. (2010) real rigidities are due to households’ preferences implying non-
constant price elasticity of demand, as is the case in this paper. However, Sbordone’s analysis is based
on a closed-economy rather than an open-economy model. Guerrieri, Gust and López-Salido do not
allow for the impact of trade integration on ﬁrms’ steady-state mark-ups and market shares, which
this paper takes into account. Benigno and Faia (2010) consider a different source of real rigidity. In
their analysis, variable desired mark-ups arise not on the demand side of the economy but from stra-
tegic pricing associated with oligopolistic competition.
The second part of the paper analyses the impact of trade openness and competition on the fre-
quency of price adjustment. Despite the central role that nominal price rigidities play in macroeconomic
theory, their determinants are not well understood. Existing studies investigating the determinants
of the frequency of price adjustment focus on the role of trend inﬂation, the size of the price adjust-
ment costs and the variance of shocks (Devereux and Yetman, 2002; Dotsey et al., 1999; Kiley, 2000;
Levin and Yun, 2007; Romer, 1990) and monetary policy preferences (Kimura and Kurozumi, 2010;
Senay and Sutherland, 2014). At the same time, there is substantial empirical evidence that the fre-
quency with which ﬁrms change their prices depends on the degree of competition. Recent surveys
of ﬁrms’ pricing policies conducted in a number of countries indicate that companies operating in
markets with higher competitive pressure adjust their prices more frequently (Álvarez and Hernando,
2005, 2007; Aucremanne and Druant, 2005; Druant et al., 2009; Fabiani et al., 2005; Hoeberichts and
Stokman, 2010; Vermeulen et al., 2007). In a study conducted by the Bank of England, UK ﬁrms named
an increase in competition as the most important factor behind the rise in the frequency with which
they changed their prices over the last decade (Greenslade and Parker, 2012). The positive link between
the degree of competition and the frequency of price adjustment has also been conﬁrmed by empir-
ical studies based on disaggregated price data (Álvarez et al., 2006; Carlton, 1986; Cornille and Dossche,
2006; Encaoua and Geroski, 1986; Geroski, 1992; Lünnemann and Matha, 2005). Álvarez et al. (2010)
ﬁnd that the frequency of producer price changes increases with import penetration. Despite the con-
siderable empirical evidence, the theoretical literature investigating the relationship between competition
and the speed of price adjustment is scant and the mechanism underlying it remains unclear.
Industrial organisation studies which analyse the impact of competition on the degree of nominal
price rigidities in an oligopolistic environment provide conﬂicting results concerning the direction of
8 Rogoff (2003) postulated that globalisation affects inﬂation through its impact on price ﬂexibility; however, he did not for-
malise this argument in a structural macroeconomic model.
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this relationship.9 The inﬂuence of competition on the frequency of price adjustment under the as-
sumption of monopolistic competition, which prevails in macroeconomic models, has hardly been
examined. Some insights into the effects of competition on nominal rigidities in a monopolistically
competitive environment can be gained from analysing the link between the price elasticity of demand
and the frequency of price adjustment. Martin (1993) conducted such an analysis within a simple static
setting, while Dotsey et al. (1999) used a dynamic general equilibrium model with state-dependent
pricing. However, while a change in the price elasticity of demand can be an important outcome of
the entry of new ﬁrms into a market and the associated increase in competition, it is not the only
consequence. Changes in the number of traded varieties also affect ﬁrms’ market shares, the degree
of strategic complementarity in price-setting decisions and the variability of desired prices, all of which
inﬂuence ﬁrms’ incentives to adjust their prices. In contrast to previous studies, this paper analyses
the effects of competition on the frequency of price changes in a dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium model with real rigidities and a variable number of traded varieties which takes all these effects
into account.
3. Model
The analysis is based on a New-Keynesian open-economy DSGE model. The world economy con-
sists of two symmetric countries, Home and Foreign. Each country is populated by utility-maximising
households and proﬁt-maximising ﬁrms, owned by households, which produce differentiated goods
and sell them in monopolistically competitive markets. There are two types of ﬁrms – exporters, which
sell their goods in both the domestic and foreign economy, and non-exporters, which operate only in
the domestic market. Firms set their prices using pricing-to-market, as in Betts and Devereux (1996),
and Calvo contracts, as in Calvo (1983). In the baseline version of the model it is assumed that the
probability of price adjustment in a given period is exogenous. Households consume all varieties which
are sold in the domestic market. Their consumption aggregator is characterised by non-constant price
elasticity of demand, which gives rise to strategic complementarity in ﬁrms’ price-setting decisions
– a ﬁrm’s optimal relative price depends not only on its marginal cost but is also positively related to
the prices charged by its competitors. In each country monetary policy is conducted by a central bank
which sets the nominal interest rate following a Taylor rule. Business cycles are driven by productiv-
ity, preference and monetary policy shocks.
3.1. Firms
In each country, there is a continuum of ﬁrms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. All ﬁrms operating in the Home
economy produce differentiated ﬁnal consumption goods and sell them in an environment of mo-
nopolistic competitition. They use a production technology with constant returns to scale in which
domestic labour is the only factor of production:
Y A Li t t i t, ,= (1)
where Yi t, is the output produced by ﬁrm i at time t and Li t, is the labour input used in the produc-
tion of that good. At denotes the level of technology which follows an exogenous process:
ln lnA At a t ta= +−ρ ξ1 such that ρa ∈〈0 1, ) and ξ σta aN∼ 0 2, .( )
In the Home and in the Foreign economy, a fraction of ﬁrms, equal to N and N* respectively, sell
their goods both in the domestic market and abroad, whereas the remaining ﬁrms sell their goods
only in the domestic market. All ﬁrms set their prices in the currency of the country in which their
goods are sold.10
Non-exporting ﬁrms in the Home economy, located in the interval [N, 1], set their prices to maxi-
mise their expected discounted proﬁts subject to the demand function, the production technology and
9 See Ginsburgh and Michel (1988) for a brief review.
10 Throughout the paper, Foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk.
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the Calvo contracts. When they receive a signal to update their prices at time t, they choose the price
of their product in the domestic market, PH i t, , , that maximises:
E Q C P MCt k t t k H i t k H i t i t k
k
α , , , , , ,+ + +
=
∞
−( )( )∑
0
(2)
where CH i t, , is the Home demand for the good produced by ﬁrm i at time t, MCi t, denotes the ﬁrm’s
nominal marginal cost at time t, Qt t k, + is the stochastic discount factor for nominal payoffs and
α ∈ (0, 1) represents the fraction of ﬁrms that do not adjust their prices in a given period.
Exporting ﬁrms in the Home economy, located in the interval [0, N], also maximise their expected
discounted proﬁts subject to similar constraints. However, they set two different prices – one for the
Home market, PH i t, , , and one for the Foreign market, PF i t, ,∗ , so that they maximise:
E Q C P MC C S P MCt k t t k H i t k H i t i t k F i t k t k F i tα , , , , , , , , , ,+ + + + +−( ) + ∗ ∗ − i t k
k
, +
=
∞ ( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( )∑
0
(3)
where CF i t, ,∗ denotes the Foreign demand for the good produced by ﬁrm i at time t; St is the nominal
exchange rate at time t, deﬁned as the price of one unit of Foreign currency in terms of Home cur-
rency. The price PH i t, , is expressed in the Home currency, whereas PF i t, ,∗ is expressed in the currency
of the Foreign economy.
The assumption that exporters are engaging in international price discrimination is consistent with
the ﬁndings from substantial empirical literature on pricing-to-market which shows that the same
goods are priced with different mark-ups across importing markets (see Goldberg and Knetter, 1997,
for an extensive review).
3.2. Households
Each country is populated by a continuum of identical, inﬁnitely-lived households located in the
interval [0, 1]. A representative household has a utility function which is additively separable in con-
sumption, Ct, and labour, Lt, and given by:
E
C
e
L
t
k t k u t k
k
tβ
σ ϕ
σ ϕ
+
−
+
+
=
∞
−
−
+
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥∑
1 1
0 1 1
(4)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the intertemporal discount factor, σ > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution in consumption, ϕ ≥ 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply, and eut
represents a shock to the marginal utility of consumption such that u ut u t tu= +−ρ ξ1 where ρu ∈〈0 1, ) and
ξ σtu uN∼ 0 2, .( )
Households maximise their expected discounted lifetime utility subject to a sequence of budget
constraints:
P C E Q D W L D Tt t t t t t t t t t+ [ ] = + ++ +, 1 1 (5)
where Dt+1 is the nominal payoff in period t + 1 of the portfolio held at the end of period t, Wt denotes
nominal wage and Tt is a lump-sum component of income including dividends from ownership of ﬁrms.
It is assumed that in both countries, households have unrestricted access to a complete set of con-
tingent claims, traded internationally.
3.3. Demand aggregator
Households in the Home economy consume all domestically produced differentiated goods and
all Foreign varieties available in the domestic market. Their consumption aggregator, Ct, is implicitly
deﬁned by the condition:
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f
C
C
di f
C
C
diH i t
t
F i t
t
N, , , ,*⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ + ⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ =∫ ∫ +( )01 11 1 (6)
where f
C
C
X i t
t
, ,⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ is an increasing, strictly concave function and X = {H, F}. The consumption aggregator
adopted in the analysis extends the aggregators suggested by Kimball (1995) and Sbordone (2010) to
an open-economy environment with a variable number of traded varieties.
The parameter N *∈〈 〉0 1, is the fraction of Foreign goods which are exported to the Home economy
and it determines the degree of trade openness. The total number of varieties available for sale in the
Home market is equal to 1+( )N * and it is a measure of the level of competition in the economy.
The functional form of f
C
C
X i t
t
, ,⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ used in the analysis is given by:
f
C
C
C
C N
X i t
t
X i t
t
, , , ,⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ = +( ) +( ) −
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥ − + +( )
1
1
1
1
1
1
1η γ
η η
η γ
γ
*
−
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥1 (7)
where the parameters η and γ determine the shape of the demand function.
The demand aggregator deﬁned in this way departs from the standard assumption of constant price-
elasticity of demand and introduces strategic complementarity in ﬁrms’ price-setting decisions which
generates variable desired mark-ups.11 It is shown in Appendix A.1 that the demand function associ-
ated with the consumption aggregator adopted can be written as:
C
C
P
P
X i t
t
X i t
t
, , , ,
=
+
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ + +
−1
1 1
1
1
η
η
η
γ
 (8)
where
C
C
X i t
t
, , is ﬁrm i’s market share and Pt is an aggregate, competition-based price index which is
given by12:
P P di P dit H i t F i t
N
= ( ) + ( )⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥− −
+
−
∫ ∫ ∗, , , ,γγ γγ
γ
γ
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
(9)
Its derivation is shown in Appendix A.2.
In the framework adopted, the price elasticity of demand, θX i t, , , is not constant, as is usually assumed,
but is a function of ﬁrm i’s relative price and its market share:
θX t X i t
t
X i t
t
X i t
t
X i t
t
C
C
f
C
C
C
C
f
C
C
,
, ,
, ,
, , , ,
⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ = −
′
⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟
′′
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−
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
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−
−
1
1
1
1
1
1
γ
η
γ
γ
P
P
P
P
X i t
t
X i t
t
, ,
, ,


(10)
In consequence, ﬁrm i’s desired mark-up, μX i t, , , is also a function of the ﬁrm’s relative price13:
11 Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007) show that allowing for non-constant price elasticity of demand in Calvo-style models is im-
portant for rendering these models consistent with price duration data.
12 This competition-based aggregate price index differs from the utility-based price index, Pt, deﬁned as the cost of a unit of
the composite good, Ct, but is also a homogenous function of degree one.
13 Surveys conducted among ﬁrms in the Euro Area and in the UK indicate that pricing strategies based on variable mark-
ups are widespread (Fabiani et al., 2005; Greenslade and Parker, 2012).
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In an equilibrium with symmetric prices, ﬁrm i’s market share is a function of the number of va-
rieties traded in the economy, given by:
C
C
f
N N
X i,
=
+
⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ = + +
⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ +
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥
−1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1* *η
ηγ (12)
As a result, the steady-state price elasticity of demand, θ, and mark-up, μ, are also determined by
the number of varieties traded and the level of competition in the economy:
θ
γ η γ
= −
− + +( )
1
1
1
1 1
1( ) N *
(13)
μ
γ η γ
=
+ −( ) + +( )⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
1
1 1 1 1
1
N *
(14)
The positive relationship between the number of varieties sold in a market and the steady-state
price elasticity of demand, which is incorporated into the model through the speciﬁcation of house-
holds’ preferences, is in line with the theory developed by Lancaster (1979), according to which ﬁrms’
entry causes ‘crowding’ of the varieties space. As more ﬁrms sell their differentiated products in the
market, varieties become more substitutable and their own price elasticity of demand increases. The
existence of a positive link between the number of varieties and the price elasticity of demand has
been empirically supported by Hummels and Lugovskyy (2008).
The number of traded varieties also affects the curvature of the demand function, denoted by ε ,
which is the steady-state value of the elasticity of the price elasticity of demand with respect to the
relative price, also referred to as the superelasticity of demand, and is given by:
ε
γ
η
η γ
=
−( ) + +( )−
1
1 1
1
N *
(15)
The functional form of the demand aggregator adopted in the analysis has the convenient property
that in the special case of η = 0 it is equivalent to a standard CES Dixit–Stiglitz consumption aggregator.
3.4. Monetary policy
Following Taylor (1993), in each country there is a central bank which sets the nominal interest
rate, it, according to a simple rule:
  i x vt t y t t= + +φ π φπ (16)
where πt is the deviation of inﬂation from its target, xt is the domestic output gap, deﬁned as the
difference between actual and potential output, and vt is amonetary policy shock such that v vt v t tv= +−ρ ξ1 ,
where ρv ∈〈0 1, ) and ξ σtv vN∼ 0 2, .( )
Determinacy of the model solution is ensured by choosing policy parameters φπ and φy such that
the Taylor principle is satisﬁed.
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The monetary policy rule in the Home and Foreign economy together with the optimality condi-
tions of proﬁt-maximising ﬁrms and utility-maximising households and the resource constraints in
both countries determine the equilibrium in the world economy.
4. Parametrisation
The model is calibrated assuming that one period of time corresponds to one quarter. In the bench-
mark calibration of the model parameters, ﬁrms’ probability of not receiving a price adjustment signal
in a given period, denoted by α, is set to 0.75. The discount factor β is assumed to be equal to 0.995,
which implies an annual steady-state real interest rate of 2 per cent. The parameters of the mone-
tary policy rule corresponding to the weights that the central bank places on inﬂation and output
stabilisation, given by φπ and φy , are set to 1.5 and 0.5 respectively, as in Taylor (1993). The values of
the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, σ, and the inverse of the
Frisch elasticity of labour supply, ϕ , are set to 1.38 and 1.83 respectively, in line with Smets andWouters’s
(2007) estimates. The parametrisation of the shock processes is also based on Smets andWouters (2007).
A complete set of the values of the model parameters adopted in this analysis is listed in Table A1in
Appendix A.6.
The parameters γ and η, which control the shape of the demand function, are calibrated based on
the study by Dossche et al. (2010). The authors use scanner price data from a large Euro Area retailer
to estimate the price elasticity and superelasticity of demand for a wide range of products. They provide
empirical evidence that the price elasticity of demand rises with relative price, which supports the
introduction of concave demand functions intomacroeconomicmodels. The study shows that the degree
of strategic complementarity in ﬁrms’ price-setting decisions, determined by the curvature of the demand
function, is quite small and that it is strongly positively correlated with the price elasticity of demand.
Based on the ﬁndings of Dossche et al. (2010), two different parametrisations of the demand func-
tion are considered. The values of the parameters adopted in this analysis are η1 = −0.30 and γ1 = 0.62
in the baseline calibration and η2 = −0.28 and γ2 = 0.67 in an alternative calibration.
Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate the properties of the demand function for the two calibrations adopted through-
out the analysis. Fig. 1 shows how ﬁrms’ price elasticity of demand and proﬁts alter with changes in
the relative price and how they compare with those obtained for a CES demand function. The ﬁgure
demonstrates that in the case of a concave demand function and the associated strategic comple-
mentarity in ﬁrms’ price-setting decisions, a ﬁrm’s price elasticity of demand is an increasing function
of its relative price. As a result, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts are more sensitive to changes in relative prices than
in the case of the Dixit–Stiglitz consumption aggregator with constant price elasticity of demand.
In the framework adopted, the price elasticity of demand varies not only with a ﬁrm’s relative price
but also with the degree of competition in the economy. The relationships between the level of com-
petition, measured by 1+( )N * , the steady-statemark-up, μ, the corresponding steady-state price elasticity
of demand, θ, and the superelasticity of demand, ε , are shown in Fig. 2. The ﬁgure demonstrates a
negative relationship between competition and ﬁrms’ desired mark-ups. As the number of foreign ﬁrms
in the domestic market increases from 0 to 1, which corresponds to a 100 per cent increase in the number
of all varieties traded in the economy, the steady-state mark-up declines from 36 to 3 per cent in the
baseline calibration and from 31 to 8 per cent in the alternative calibration.
5. Competition and real rigidities
In the framework with non-constant price elasticity of demand and a variable number of traded
varieties developed above, inﬂation in the sector of domestically produced goods, πH t, , is deter-
mined according to the following Phillips Curve14:
14 The equation is derived in Appendix A.4. The derivations of domestic and imported price indices, both utility-based and
competition-based, as well as domestic and foreign demand functions, which are necessary in order to derive the Phillips Curve
equations for inﬂation in the domestic and imported goods sectors, are presented in Appendices A.1–A.3.
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Fig. 1. Price elasticity of demand and proﬁts as functions of relative price. Note: top two graphs (red line): η γ= − =0 30 0 62. , . ; bottom two graphs (blue line) η γ= − =0 28 0 67. , . ; solid
line: non-CES demand function; dotted line: CES demand function. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article.)
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Fig. 2. Desired mark-up, price elasticity of demand and superelasticity of demand as functions of the number of varieties traded. Note: solid (red) line: η γ= − =0 30 0 62. , . ; dotted (blue)
line: η γ= − =0 28 0 67. , . . (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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    π β π λ α αβ
α θ
ϖH t t H t t H t F tE mcr
d
p p, , , ,= +
−( ) −( )
−
−
−( )⎡⎣⎢
⎤
+1
1 1
1 ⎦⎥ (17)
where λ θ
θ
=
−
− +
1
1 d
is a structural parameter reﬂecting the degree of strategic complementarity in ﬁrms’
price-setting decisions, ϖ =
+
N
N
*
*1
is the share of imported goods in the consumption basket and
d =
−
+
1
1γ
θ ; mcrt is the log deviation of the domestic real marginal cost from its steady state at time
t; pH t, and pF t, denote the log deviations of the domestic and imported price indices, derived in Ap-
pendix A.3, from their respective steady states at time t.
Equation (17) shows that in the presence of strategic complementarity in ﬁrms’ price-setting de-
cisions, domestic inﬂation depends not only on marginal cost but also on the relative price of domestic
to imported goods. This is due to the fact that changes in the ratio of domestic to import prices affect
the price elasticity of demand and ﬁrms’ desired mark-ups. To give an example, following a decrease
in the price of imports which leads to an increase in the relative price of domestic goods, domestic
producers face higher price elasticity of demand which prompts them to lower their mark-ups. As a
result, domestic prices decline even if marginal cost remains unchanged.
Furthermore, the coeﬃcients of the Phillips Curve depend on the number of varieties traded and
the level of competition in the economy. The level of competition determines ﬁrms’ price elasticity
of demand and the sensitivity of their optimal price to the prices charged by their competitors and
affects both the sensitivity of domestic inﬂation to changes in real marginal cost and relative inter-
national prices. Firstly, an increase in competitive pressure in the Home economy, corresponding to
an increase in 1+N * , leads to a decrease in λ and therefore also a decline in the elasticity of inﬂation
with respect to domestic marginal cost and an increase in the degree of real rigidities in price setting.
Secondly, an increase in the number of imported varieties in the domestic market, resulting in higher
ϖ, raises the sensitivity of domestic inﬂation to changes in the ratio of domestic to import prices.15
Fig. 3 shows the relationship between the level of competition and the coeﬃcients of the Phillips
Curve. For the two calibrations of the model adopted in the analysis, an increase in the number of
traded varieties by 100 per cent leads to a decrease in the elasticity of inﬂation with respect to real
marginal cost by 26 and 27 per cent. At the same time, the coeﬃcient on relative international prices
rises from 0 to about 0.02.
The considerable increase in the sensitivity of domestic inﬂation to changes in the relative price
of domestic to imported goods may suggest that an increase in the openness of the economy and com-
petition leads to a dramatic increase in the importance of foreign economic developments in the
determination of domestic inﬂation. However, it should be noted that this effect is partly counterbal-
anced by the fact that an increase in competition and the resulting increase in the degree of strategic
complementarity among ﬁrms raises the impact of the prices of domestic goods on the prices of goods
which are imported. This is evident from the equation for imported goods inﬂation, π F t, , given by16:
     π β π λ α αβ
α θ
ϖF t t F t t t F tE mcr z
d
p p, , ,= +
−( ) −( ) ∗ + −
−
−( ) −+1 1 1 1 1 H t,( )
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥ (18)
where λ θ
θ
=
−
− +
1
1 d
, d =
−
+
1
1γ
θ and 1 1
1
−( ) =
+
ϖ
N *
is the share of domestically produced goods in the
consumption basket; mcrt ∗ is the log deviation of the real marginal cost of the Foreign ﬁrms from its
steady state at time t; zt , given by    z p p st H t F t t= ∗ − +, , , denotes the deviation from the law of one price
15 Guerrieri et al. (2010) also ﬁnd that in the presence of strategic complementarity domestic inﬂation depends on the rel-
ative price of domestic and imported goods. However, as their analysis does not take into account the impact of trade integration
and competition on steady-state mark-ups, the elasticity of inﬂation with regard to marginal cost is independent of the level
of competition. In contrast, Sbordone (2010) accounts for the impact of competition on the sensitivity of inﬂation to marginal
cost but ignores the role of international relative prices in the determination of domestic inﬂation.
16 For derivation see Appendix A.4.
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at time t – the discrepancy between the prices of imported goods charged in the Foreign and Home
markets and expressed in the Home currency.17
The effects of changes in the openness of the economy on inﬂation dynamics are illustrated by ex-
amining the impact of a positive one-standard-deviation productivity shock in the Home economy
on inﬂation and its components in both the Home and Foreign economies, which is shown in Fig. 4.18
The ﬁgure compares the responses of inﬂation to the shock in models with constant and non-
constant price elasticity of demand.19 As would be expected, in the more open economy, the responses
of Home price indices to a Home shock are relatively weaker and the responses of Foreign variables
to such a shock are relatively stronger than in the less open economy. However, the effects of changes
in openness on inﬂation aremore pronounced in the presence of non-constant price elasticity of demand
and strategic complementarity in ﬁrms’ price-setting behaviour due to the additional competitive effects
of trade integration discussed above.
6. Endogenous frequency of price adjustment
In the analysis, it has so far been assumed that the fraction of ﬁrms which adjust their prices in
each period, given by (1 − α), is exogenously determined and does not depend on the level of com-
petition in the economy. However, surveys of ﬁrms’ price-setting behaviour as well as empirical studies
based on micro price data strongly suggest that the intensity of competitive pressures faced by ﬁrms
17 pH t,∗ is the log deviation of the price of the Foreign good in the Foreign market expressed in the Foreign currency from its
steady state,

pF t, denotes the log deviation of the price of the Foreign good in the Home market expressed in the Home cur-
rency from its steady state and

st is the log deviation of the nominal exchange rate from its steady-state level.
18 Two levels of openness are considered, one in which foreign goods constitute 20 per cent of all goods sold in the domestic
economy and one in which the share of foreign goods in the consumption basket is equal to 43 per cent, which correspond to
N = 0.25 and N = 0.75 respectively. The difference in trade openness in these two parametrisations is similar to the increase in
openness in Germany between 1993 and 2012.
19 In the model with constant price elasticity of demand, ﬁrms’ steady-state desired mark-ups are set to 19 per cent, which
corresponds to the desired mark-ups obtained for N* = 0.5 in the non-constant price elasticity model.
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Fig. 3. Coeﬃcients of the Phillips Curve as functions of the number of varieties traded. Note: solid (red) line: η γ= − =0 30 0 62. , . ;
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affects the frequency with which they change their prices. In order to take this effect into account, in
what follows the frequency of price adjustment is endogenised. It is still assumed that ﬁrms set their
prices in a time-dependent manner; however, it is now posited that for a given set of structural fea-
tures of the economy, including the level of competition, they are able to choose the frequency of price
adjustment optimally.
As in Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007), the assumption that ﬁrms use time-dependent rather than
state-dependent pricing policies is motivated by the presence of re-optimisation costs such as the costs
associated with information-gathering, decision-making, negotiation and communication, which do
not make it optimal for ﬁrms to review their prices in each period. Using microeconomic data, Zbaracki
et al. (2004) show that these costs are substantially more important than menu costs.20
6.1. Firms’ price setting decisions
In this framework, ﬁrms’ pricing decisions can be thought of as being taken in two stages. In the
ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms decide on their pricing policy – they choose a frequency of price adjustment which,
for a given structure of the economy and a given cost of price adjustment, maximises the expected
discounted value of their lifetime proﬁts. In the second stage, ﬁrms set their prices optimally in line
with their chosen pricing policy. In other words, once the frequency of price adjustment has been chosen,
ﬁrms take it as given in subsequent periods and adjust their prices accordingly as long as the struc-
ture of the economy remains unchanged.
Following Rotemberg (1982) and Romer (1990), ﬁrm i’s problem of proﬁt maximisation associ-
ated with its choice of the frequency of price adjustment is equivalent to the problem of minimisation
of the unconditional expected value of the following loss function21:
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with respect to αi, where αi is the probability that ﬁrm i keeps its price unchanged in a given period;
α is the fraction of all ﬁrms which do not adjust their prices in a given period; G is the cost of price
adjustment;
P
P
i t
f
t
, is the optimal relative price in period t if prices were adjusted without cost in each
period;
P
P
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, is the optimal relative price in period t in the presence of nominal rigidities and price
adjustment costs. Πt k i t k
f
t k
P
P+
+
+
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟, denotes ﬁrm i’s proﬁt at time t + k if its price is equal to
P
P
i t k
f
t k
, +
+
, and
Πt k i t
o
t k
P
P+ +
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟, is ﬁrm i’s proﬁt at time t + k if its price is equal to
P
P
i t
o
t k
,
+
.
The loss function represents the difference in the expected present value of ﬁrm i’s proﬁts in the
case in which it adjusts its price in a given period with probability 1−( )αi and incurs a ﬁxed cost of
price adjustment and the case in which it adjusts its price in each period without any costs. The ﬁrst
term on the right hand side of the equation reﬂects the cost of setting a new price in period t, the
second term denotes the loss in proﬁt resulting from keeping this price unchanged in subsequent periods,
whereas the last term represents the sum of losses in proﬁt from setting a new price in some future
period and keeping it unchanged thereafter.
20 The assumption of time-dependent price setting policies is also consistent with survey evidence. Firms’ surveys indicate
that in the Euro Area 34 per cent of ﬁrms use purely time-dependent pricing policies, whereas about 46 per cent of them use
a combination of time- and state-dependent strategies (Fabiani et al., 2005). In the US the fraction of ﬁrms reviewing their
prices on a periodic basis is even higher and equals 40 per cent (Blinder et al., 1998).
21 For tractability, it is assumed that ﬁrms choose the frequency with which they change their prices in the domestic market
optimally and that exporters adopt the same frequency of price adjustment for exports. In consequence, the frequency of price
adjustment of all goods sold in the economy, whether they are domestically produced or imported, is the same.
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Using the law of iterated expectations, E E L E Lt t k i t i0 0+ ( )[ ] = ( )[ ]α α α α, , , the unconditional expected
value of the loss function (19), given by L E LE i t iα α α α, ,( ) = ( )[ ]0 , can be expressed as follows:
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Minimisation of (20) with respect to αi gives rise to the following ﬁrst-order condition, which in
equilibrium must hold for all ﬁrms:
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When choosing their frequency of price adjustment 1−( )αi , ﬁrms take as given the frequency of
price adjustment of other ﬁrms. The condition for the economy-wide frequency of price adjustment
(1 − α) to be a symmetric Nash equilibrium is that the optimality condition (21) holds at αi equal to
α for all ﬁrms. Therefore, the frequency of price adjustment (1 − αi) which satisﬁes (21) with αi = α
for all ﬁrms is the optimal frequency of price adjustment.
6.2. Forces driving the optimal frequency of price adjustment
The ﬁrst-order condition (21) shows that the optimal frequency of price adjustment equalises the
cost of price adjustment with the opportunity cost of not adjusting prices. This opportunity cost depends
on the expected discounted sum of the differences between proﬁts obtained at the optimal ﬂexible
price and the actual price in a given period. The greater the differences, the greater incentive ﬁrms
have to adjust their prices. In order to understand the determinants of the frequency of price adjust-
ment, it is therefore crucial to identify the factors determining the difference between proﬁts obtained
at a price which would be optimal for a given period if ﬁrms were able to adjust their prices in each
period without cost and proﬁts obtained at the prevailing price in that period. This difference will hence-
forth be referred to as the ‘period loss function’.
After a second-order approximation of ﬁrm i’s proﬁts, Πt k i t
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The approximation (22) reveals that the loss in proﬁts in a given period depends on two factors:
the deviation of the optimal relative price from the actual price in that period,
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, , which determines the opportunity cost of a given devi-
ation of the actual price from the optimal ﬂexible price.
The period loss function can be further approximated and rewritten as a function of the steady-
state values of the model variables and the log deviations of the optimal ﬂexible price and the actual
price from their steady states22:
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22 For derivation see Appendix A.5.
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The proﬁt loss associated with a given deviation of the actual price from the optimal price depends
on the sensitivity of demand to changes in a ﬁrm’s relative price, which is determined by the price
elasticity of demand and the superelasticity of demand. It also depends on the steady-state demand
for the ﬁrm’s product, which is determined by the ﬁrm’s steady-state market share and the steady-
state level of output. The deviation of the optimal relative price from the actual price depends on a
number of structural features of the economy, including the degree of strategic complementarity in
ﬁrms’ price setting decisions, the importance of the relative price of imported to domestic goods in
the determination of domestic inﬂation and the frequency with which ﬁrms change their prices.
6.3. Competition and nominal rigidities
Having identiﬁed the factors determining the opportunity cost of not adjusting prices, it is now
possible to analyse how they are affected by the level of competition in the economy. Firstly, the level
of competition affects ﬁrms’ steady-state revenues and proﬁts. There are two forces acting in oppo-
site directions. On the one hand, an increase in the number of competitors lowers ﬁrms’ steady-state
market shares,
Y
Y
i , and mark-ups, μ θ
θ
=
−1
, which has a negative impact on ﬁrms’ proﬁts and drives
the opportunity cost of not adjusting prices down. On the other hand, however, an increase in com-
petitive pressure reduces the distortion associated with imperfect competition and increases the steady-
state level of output, Y, which raises ﬁrms’ proﬁts and thereby strengthens their incentives to adjust
prices. Secondly, a rise in competition increases the sensitivity of ﬁrms’ proﬁts to a given deviation
of the actual price from the desired price. Greater competition is associated with higher price elas-
ticity of demand, θ, and higher superelasticity of demand, ε , which makes it costlier for ﬁrms to keep
their prices unchanged. Furthermore, an increase in trade openness and competition increases stra-
tegic complementarity in ﬁrms’ price-setting decisions and the importance of the relative price of
domestic to imported goods in the determination of domestic inﬂation, which inﬂuence the devia-
tions of ﬁrms’ prices from their desired prices,  p pi t kf i to, ,+ − , and thereby also the costs and beneﬁts of
price adjustment. Finally, the deviations of a ﬁrm’s price from its desired price are also affected by
the frequency of price adjustment by other ﬁrms in the economy, which in turn depends on the level
of openness and competition.
The analysis shows that competition affects several determinants of the opportunity cost of not
adjusting prices and that there are divergent forces at work. The net effect of greater competition on
the degree of nominal price rigidities can be determined numerically.
Combining (21) and (23), the equilibrium condition associated with the choice of a ﬁrm’s pricing
policy can be written as follows:
G E k
P
P
Y
Y
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k
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i+ ( ) − −( )[ ] ⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ ⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ + −( )−0 1 1
1
2
1α β α β α β θ ε  ,t kf i to
k
p+
=
∞
−( ) =∑  , 2
0
0 (24)
For a given level of competition, the equilibrium frequency of price adjustment can be obtained
in the following way. Firstly, the model described in Section 3 is solved for a given level of α. Sec-
ondly, the obtained solution is substituted into equation (24) and it is examined whether the condition
holds with αi equal to α. The α for which this is the case determines the equilibrium frequency of
price adjustment. This strategy can be used to ﬁnd the optimal frequency of price adjustment for dif-
ferent levels of competition.
Figs. 5 and 6 illustrate the relationship between the level of competition and the price adjust-
ment frequency, (1 − α), for two different calibrations of the demand function. They show that competition
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generally has a positive impact on the optimal frequency of price changes. A 100 per cent increase in
the number of varieties available to domestic consumers, associated with a decline in mark-ups from
36 to 3 per cent in the baseline calibration and from 31 to 8 per cent in the alternative calibration, leads
to an increase in the share of ﬁrms adjusting their prices in a given period from 35 per cent to 49 and
41 per cent respectively.23
The effects of greater competition are relatively small and ambiguous when the initial levels of the
openness of the economy and competition are low and they are much larger for a higher initial degree
of openness and competitive pressure. This is due to the fact that when a ﬁrm enjoys high market
power and its steady-state mark-up is high, an increase in competition resulting in a decline in this
mark-up by one percentage point is associated with relatively small increases in the steady-state price
elasticity and superelasticity of demand. While these increases raise the proﬁt loss resulting from a
given deviation of the ﬁrm’s actual price from its optimal price, this effect is to some extent offset by
a decrease in the average deviation of the actual price from the desired price induced by higher com-
petition. In turn, when a ﬁrm’s steady-state mark-up is low, a decrease in this mark-up by one percentage
point gives rise to a substantial increase in both price elasticity and superelasticity of demand and
this increase has a strong and dominating effect on ﬁrms’ incentives to adjust their prices.
The analysis of the impact of trade openness and competition on the frequency with which ﬁrms
change their prices demonstrates that greater competitive pressure reduces the degree of nominal
price rigidities, which is consistent with empirical and survey evidence concerning ﬁrms’ price-
setting behaviour.
23 When solving for the optimal frequency of price adjustment, the value of the price adjustment cost, G, is calibrated based
on a study by Zbaracki et al. (2004), who estimate that these costs constitute 1.22 per cent of ﬁrms’ revenues. Setting these
costs equal to about 4 per cent of ﬁrms’ revenues, an estimate obtained by Willis (2000), reduces the optimal price adjust-
ment frequency by about 6–8 percentage points for any given level of competition as compared to the benchmark calibration.
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Fig. 5. Optimal frequency of price adjustment as a function of the number of varieties traded. Note: solid (red) line:
η γ= − =0 30 0 62. , . ; dotted (blue) line: η γ= − =0 28 0 67. , . . (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend,
the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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6.4. Other determinants of the frequency of price adjustment
Competition is not the only factor affecting the optimal frequency of price adjustment. Any changes
in the structural features of the economy which inﬂuence the variability of desired prices also affect
the average deviation of the actual price from the optimal price and therefore the optimal price ad-
justment frequency. One such feature is the magnitude of shocks hitting the economy.
Fig. 7 shows the optimal frequency of price adjustment for different values of the standard devi-
ation of shocks. A 20 per cent decrease in the standard deviations of all macroeconomic shocks reduces
the opportunity cost of not adjusting prices and leads to a decrease in the fraction of ﬁrms updating
their prices in a given period by about 3 percentage points for any given level of competition.24
For a similar reason, the optimal frequency of price adjustment also depends on the parameters
of the monetary policy rule. The greater weight the central bank places on inﬂation stabilisation, the
less variable is the desired price and the less frequent the price adjustment.25 An increase in ϕπ from
1.5 to 2.0 reduces the fraction of ﬁrms adjusting their prices in a given period by 5–7 percentage points,
which is illustrated in Fig. 8.
The analysis sheds new light on the results from previous studies, discussed in Section 2, which
identiﬁed a number of factors inﬂuencing the short-run inﬂation–output trade-off and its relation-
ship with trade openness. By affecting the opportunity cost of not adjusting prices, any factors which
inﬂuence the level and volatility of inﬂation and hence also the variability of desired prices, such as
24 A similar result has been obtained by Romer (1990) who also ﬁnds a positive relationship between the frequency of price
changes and the variance of shocks.
25 This result conﬁrms ﬁndings by Kimura and Kurozumi (2010) and Senay and Sutherland (2014) obtained in closed-
economy models. They also show that the frequency of price adjustment is negatively related to the weight that the central
bank places on inﬂation stabilisation.
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Fig. 6. Optimal frequency of price adjustment as a function of the mark-up. Note: solid (red) line: η γ= − =0 30 0 62. , . ; dotted
(blue) line: η γ= − =0 28 0 67. , . . (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the
web version of this article.)
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Fig. 7. Optimal frequency of price adjustment as a function of the mark-up and the number of varieties traded for different
parametrisations of the shock processes. Note: solid line: σ σ σ1 1 10 45 0 53 0 24, , ,. ; . ; . ;a u v= = = dotted line: σ σ σ σ2 1 2 10 8 0 8, , , ,. ; . ;a a u u= =
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Fig. 8. Optimal frequency of price adjustment as a function of the mark-up and the number of varieties traded for different
parametrisations of the monetary policy rule. Note: solid line: ϕπ = 1.5; dotted line: ϕπ = 2.0; the demand function param-
eters are: η = −0.30, γ = 0.62.
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central bank independence, exchange rate pass-through and the exchange rate regime, may lead to
changes in the optimal frequency of price adjustment and the sensitivity of inﬂation to ﬂuctuations
in domestic economic activity.
6.5. Competition and the Phillips Curve
The study has demonstrated that greater trade openness and competition leads to a higher degree
of real price rigidities and a lower degree of nominal price rigidities in the economy. The overall impact
of openness on the parameters of the Phillips Curve is shown in Fig. 9. An increase in trade openness
and competitive pressures faced by ﬁrms unambiguously leads to an increase in the elasticity of in-
ﬂation with respect to the relative price of domestic and imported goods and this effect is particularly
strong for highly integrated economies. The inﬂuence of greater competition on price ﬂexibility and
the sensitivity of domestic inﬂation to changes in domestic marginal cost depends on the initial level
of openness and competitive pressure in the economy. For a relatively closed economy in which ﬁrms
have high market power the effect is small and negative. For a high initial level of openness and com-
petition, an increase in the frequency of price adjustment associated with trade integration more than
offsets the increase in the degree of real price rigidities and, as a result, price ﬂexibility and the elas-
ticity of inﬂation with respect to marginal cost rise. For the two calibrations of the model parameters
adopted in the analysis, greater competition results in greater sensitivity of inﬂation to changes in
real marginal cost when steady-state mark-ups are below 22–23 per cent.
By accounting for the effects of competition on price rigidities, the study provides yet another channel
through which the impact of trade openness on the slope of the Phillips curve is theoretically am-
biguous and which helps to explain the conﬂicting results concerning the direction of this relationship
obtained in the empirical literature. Furthermore, the ﬁnding that the effects of trade openness on
the inﬂation–output trade-off depend on the initial level of openness and competition is consistent
with the general pattern in the empirical results obtained for different sets of countries over differ-
ent time periods. As noted in Daniels et al. (2015), earlier studies on this topic based on data up to
the late 1980s tend to ﬁnd no or negative impact of increased openness on the sensitivity of inﬂation
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Fig. 9. Coeﬃcients of the Phillips Curve as functions of the number of varieties traded in the case of endogenous frequency of
price adjustment. Note: solid (red) line: η γ= − =0 30 0 62. , . ; dotted (blue) line: η γ= − =0 28 0 67. , . . (For interpretation of the ref-
erences to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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to changes in domestic economic activity (Daniels et al., 2005; Temple, 2002). In contrast, studies ex-
amining more recent data consistently ﬁnd evidence of a positive, statistically signiﬁcant effect of trade
openness on the slope of the Phillips Curve (Bowdler, 2009; Daniels and VanHoose, 2013; Daniels et al.,
2015; Pickering and Valle, 2012). A comparison of the shares of imports in GDP, which is the stan-
dard measure of trade openness used in the literature, reveals that the average levels of openness in
the cross-country data samples used by Bowdler (2009), Pickering and Valle (2012), Daniels and
VanHoose (2013) and Daniels et al. (2015) are higher than the average levels of openness in the data
analysed by Temple (2002) and Daniels et al. (2005), which may help to explain their different ﬁndings.
The results of this paper have several implications for future empirical work on the impact of trade
openness on the sensitivity of inﬂation to output ﬂuctuations. Firstly, as countries with different initial
levels of openness may observe very different effects of trade integration on price stickiness and in-
ﬂation, the study provides additional motivation for country-speciﬁc time-series analysis of this
relationship along the lines of Eijﬃnger and Qian (2010) which does not impose the assumption of
parameter constancy across countries. Secondly, the results suggest that both cross-country and country-
speciﬁc studies should account for the initial level of competition and ﬁrms’ market power as one of
the determinants of the impact of trade openness on the short-run trade-off between output and inﬂation.
7. Conclusions
This paper examined the impact of trade openness and product market competition on ﬁrms’ price-
setting decisions and the inﬂation–output trade-off. It provided new insights into the determinants
of real and nominal price rigidities. The analysis demonstrated that stronger competitive pressure,
resulting from a higher number of varieties available in the domestic market, raises the sensitivity of
ﬁrms’ proﬁt-maximising price to the prices charged by their competitors and the degree of real price
rigidities. The level of competition and the associated degree of strategic complementarity affect ﬁrms’
opportunity cost of not adjusting prices. There are two divergent forces at work. On the one hand,
greater competition and the resulting higher degree of real rigidities lead to a lower average devia-
tion of ﬁrms’ optimal price from their actual price following a change in economic conditions, which
reduces ﬁrms’ incentives to adjust their prices. On the other hand, higher steady-state price elastic-
ity and superelasticity of demand associated with greater competition raises the loss of proﬁt resulting
from a given deviation of the desired price from the actual price, which makes it more proﬁtable for
ﬁrms to adjust their prices. For plausible calibration of the model parameters the latter effect domi-
nates and, as a result, stronger competitive pressure leads to more frequent price adjustment and a
lower degree of nominal rigidities in the economy. The study therefore provides a theoretical expla-
nation of the positive link between competition and the frequency of price adjustment evident from
empirical studies and surveys of ﬁrms’ price-setting behaviour.
Accounting for the effects of competition on the degree of real and nominal price rigidities sheds
new light on the impact of global economic integration on the Phillips Curve and inﬂation dynamics.
In the presence of strategic complementarity in ﬁrms’ price-setting decisions, domestic inﬂation depends
not only on domestic real marginal cost but also on the ratio of the prices of imported goods to the
prices of domestically produced goods. The level of competition affects both the elasticity of inﬂa-
tion with regard tomarginal cost and relative international prices. The stronger the competitive pressure,
the greater the importance of the price ratio of imported to domestic goods in the determination of
domestic inﬂation. Due to the fact that changes in competition lead to changes in real and nominal
price rigidities in opposite directions, the overall impact of trade openness on the inﬂation–output
trade-off and the slope of the Phillips Curve is ambiguous and depends on the initial level of open-
ness and competition in the economy. For highly integrated economies the effect of trade integration
on price ﬂexibility is positive and therefore trade openness raises the sensitivity of inﬂation to changes
in domestic economic activity, which is consistent with recent empirical evidence.
There are a number of ways in which the impact of trade openness and competition on price ri-
gidities and its implications for the inﬂation–output trade-off could be explored further. Firstly, in line
with extensive empirical evidence and in order to focus on the strategic interactions between ﬁrms
selling their goods in a given market, this study assumes that ﬁrms set prices in the currency of the
country in which goods are sold. It would be interesting to consider the effects of openness on price
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stickiness under alternative assumptions concerning price setting by exporters, including producer
currency pricing and a combination of local currency pricing and producer currency pricing strate-
gies. This would make it possible to analyse the impact of the degree of exchange rate pass-through
on the relationship between trade openness and the inﬂation–output trade-off, which has been shown
to play a role in the related literature.
Furthermore, one limitation of the analysis is that in the model developed the parameters of the
monetary policy rule are assumed to be exogenous and independent of the parameters of the Phil-
lips Curve. However, studies on optimal monetary policy have shown that the inﬂation–output trade-
off affects the optimal monetary policy rule. In turn, as has been discussed in Section 6.4, by affecting
the variability of inﬂation, the parameters of the monetary policy rule affect the optimal frequency
of price adjustment. It would therefore be valuable to analyse the effects of trade openness and com-
petition on the inﬂation–output trade-off in a setting in which monetary policy parameters are
endogenously determined and which takes the above feedback effects into account.
Finally, in order to isolate the effects of trade openness on the inﬂation–output trade-off resulting
from changes in real and nominal price rigidities and provide a clear exposition of the underlying mech-
anism, the model has been kept relatively simple and does not incorporate many other channels which
have been shown to affect this relationship. In future research it would be desirable to examine the
impact of trade-openness on price ﬂexibility alongside these other channels within a richer frame-
work which would allow assessing their relative importance and providing a more comprehensive
analysis of the net effect of trade openness on the slope of the Phillips Curve.
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Appendix
A.1. Derivation of demand functions
A.1.1. Demand for individual varieties as a fraction of aggregate consumption
The consumption aggregator Ct is implicitly deﬁned by equations (6) and (7). Therefore, households
choose the levels of consumption of individual Home and Foreign varieties, CH i t, , and CF i t, , , in order
to minimise their expenditure Dt given by:
D P C di P C dit H i t H i t F i t F i t
N
= +∫ ∫+, , , , , , , ,*
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1
1
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(25)
subject to (6).
The Lagrangian for the optimisation problem is:
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The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to CX i t, , , where X = {H, F}, is given by:
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We deﬁne the competition-based aggregate price index P
Ct t
=
Λ
. After substitution:
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The demand function for an individual variety is therefore given by equation (8).
A.1.2. Demand for individual domestic varieties as a fraction of the consumption of domestic goods
The demand aggregator for the consumption of domestic goods, denoted by CH t, , is implicitly deﬁned
by:
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Households choose the levels of consumption of individual domestic varieties, CH i t, , , in order to
minimise their expenditure:
D P C diH t H i t H i t, , , , ,= ∫
0
1
(31)
subject to (29).
The Lagrangian for the optimisation problem is:
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The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to CH i t, , is given by:
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We deﬁne the competition-based domestic price index P
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The demand function for the domestic good as a fraction of the domestic consumption aggregator
is therefore given by:
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A.1.3. Demand for individual imported varieties as a fraction of the consumption of imported goods
The demand aggregator for the consumption of imported goods, denoted by CF t, , is implicitly deﬁned
by:
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Households choose the levels of consumption of individual imported varieties, CF i t, , , in order to
minimise their expenditure:
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subject to (36).
The Lagrangian for the optimisation problem is:
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The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to CF i t, , is given by:
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We deﬁne the competition-based imported price index P
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The demand function for the imported good as a fraction of domestic consumption aggregator is:
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A.2. Derivation of competition-based price indices
A.2.1. Aggregate competition-based price index
After substituting the demand function (8) into (6) we obtain:
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The competition-based aggregate price index can then be expressed as (9).
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A.2.2. Domestic competition-based price index
After substituting the demand function (35) into (29) we obtain:
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The competition-based domestic price index can then be written as:
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A.2.3. Imported competition-based price index
After substituting the demand function (42) into (36) we obtain:
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The competition-based imported price index can then be written as:
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A.3. Derivation of utility-based price indices
A.3.1. Aggregate utility-based price index
The aggregate utility-based consumption index, Pt, deﬁned as the minimum expenditure necessary
to obtain a unit level of aggregate consumption Ct, satisﬁes the following condition:
P C P C di P C di P C dit t H i t H i t F i t F i t
N
i t i t
N
= + =∫ ∫+ +, , , , , , , ,* , ,
0
1
1
1
0
1 *∫ (48)
Substituting the demand function (8) into (48) we have:
P
C
P
P
P
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t
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t
t
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⎞
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⎡
⎣
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1
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η
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After using (9) we obtain:
P P P di P dit t i t
N
i t
N
=
+( ) +
⎡
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⎤
⎦⎥
=
+
⎛
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⎞
⎠
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−
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η
η
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,
*
,
*
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⎡
⎣
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⎤
⎦
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−
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γ
γ
η
1
0
1
P dii t
N
,
*
(50)
A.3.2. Domestic utility-based price index
The domestic utility-based consumption index, PH t, , deﬁned as the minimum expenditure necessary
to obtain a unit level of domestic consumption CH t, , satisﬁes the following condition:
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P C P C diH t H t H i t H i t, , , , , ,= ∫
0
1
(51)
Substituting the demand function (35) into (51) we have:
P
C
P
P
P
CH t
H t
H i t
H i t
H t
H t,
,
, ,
, ,
,
,=
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After using (45) we obtain:
P P P diH t H t H i t, , , ,=
+( ) +
⎡
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⎤
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1
1 0
1
η
η (53)
A.3.3. Imported utility-based price index
The imported utility-based consumption index, PF t, , deﬁned as the minimum expenditure necessary
to obtain a unit level of imported consumption CF t, , satisﬁes the following condition:
P C P C diF t F t F i t F i t
N
, , , , , ,
*
=
+∫
1
1
(54)
Substituting the demand function (42) into (54) we have:
P
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P
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After using (47) we obtain:
P P P diF t F t F i t
N
, , , ,
*
=
+( ) +
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
+∫11 1
1
η
η (56)
A.4. Derivation of the Phillips Curve equations
A.4.1. Domestic price inﬂation
In order to derive the Phillips Curve for domestic inﬂation, it is necessary to solve the optimisation
problem of a domestic ﬁrm setting the price of its good in the domestic market, PH i t, , . When receiv-
ing a signal to update its price, a domestic non-exporter chooses a price of its good in the domestic
market to maximise (2) subject to (8), whereas a domestic exporter chooses a price of its good in the
domestic market such that it maximises (3) subject to (8).
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to PH i t, , is the same for both the exporter and the non-
exporter and is given by:
E Q C C MC
C
t
k
k t k
k
H i t k H i t k H i t k t k H i t k
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=
∞
+ + + + +∑ − +
0
,
, ,
t k
H i t
oP
+⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥ = 0 (57)
The equation can be rewritten as:
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P
P
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k
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+
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−
+
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We will now deﬁne the relative optimal domestic price R
P
PH i t
H i t
o
H t
, ,
, ,
,
= , real domestic marginal cost
MCR
MC
Pt k
t k
H t k
+
+
+
=
,
and domestic inﬂation ΠH t H t
H t
P
P,
,
,
.=
−1
After substitution, (58) can be expressed as:
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k
k t k H i t k H i t H i t k t k
H t ss
k
=
∞
+ + + +
+
=∑ −( ) +
0
01α θ, , , , , , ,
,Π∏
+
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥ =ΠH t H i t k, , ,θ 0 (59)
Using the fact that Q
C
C
P
P
ek t k k
t k
t
t
t k
u ut k t
, +
+
−
+
−
=
⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ +β
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and after log-linearising (59) around a symmetric
steady state we have:
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⎞
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The log deviation of the price elasticity of demand from its steady state is given by:
    θ
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Therefore, after substitution, (60) can be expressed as follows:
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where b =
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+
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⎞
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1
1
1
1θ γ
θ and ϖ =
+
N
N
*
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It therefore follows that:
    r E r E EH i t t H i t t H t H t t
k
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Using the fact that under Calvo price setting  rH i t H t, , ,=
−
α
α
π
1
we have:
α
α
π αβ π αβ π
αβ ϖ
1
1
1
1
1 1
−
−( ) =
+
+
−( ) −
+ +  
 
H t t H t t H t
t H
E E
b
mcr b p
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,t F tp−( )[ ] , (64)
The equation can then be expressed as (17).
A.4.2. Imported price inﬂation
In order to derive the Phillips Curve for inﬂation in the imported goods sector, it is necessary to solve
the optimisation problem of Foreign ﬁrms setting the price of their goods in the Home market. When
receiving a signal to update its price, a Foreign exporter chooses the price of its good in the Home
market PF i t, , to maximise:
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subject to (8).
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to PF i t, , is given by:
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The equation can be rewritten as:
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We will now deﬁne the relative optimal imported price R
P
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o
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Using the fact that Q
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and after log-linearising (68) around a symmetric
steady state we have:
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The log deviation of the price elasticity of demand from its steady state is given by:
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Therefore, after substitution, (69) can be expressed as follows:
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It therefore follows that:
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Using the fact that under Calvo price setting  rF i t F t, , ,=
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π
1
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The equation can then be expressed as (18).
A.5. Approximation of a ﬁrm’s proﬁt loss function
Using Taylor series expansion, the quadratic approximation of ﬁrm i’s proﬁts Πt k i t
o
t k
P
P+ +
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P
P
i t k
f
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, which corresponds to the price which would be optimal for ﬁrm i at time t + k if the ﬁrm were
able to adjust its price costlessly in each period, is given by:
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(74)
From the Envelope Theorem, the ﬁrst-order term is equal to zero. Therefore, the difference in proﬁts
obtained at price
P
P
i t
o
t k
,
+
prevailing at time t + k and proﬁts obtained at the optimal ﬂexible price in that
period,
P
P
i t k
f
t k
, +
+
, is given by (22).
A ﬁrm’s proﬁt (in real terms) at time t + k is equal to:
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The second derivative of the proﬁt function with respect to
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The ﬁrst-order approximation of (76) around a symmetric steady state is given by:
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Using (77), the difference in proﬁts obtained at the optimal ﬂexible price
P
P
i t k
f
t k
, +
+
and the price
P
P
i t
o
t k
,
+
,
which prevails at time t + k, can be written as:
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Therefore, up to the second order, the period loss function can be approximated as in (23).
A.6. Structural parameters
Table A1 Structural parameters.
Parameter Description Value
σ Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption 1.38
φ Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply 1.83
β Discount factor 0.995
α Probability of not receiving a signal to update prices in a given period 0.75
η1 Shape parameter of the demand function – baseline calibration −0.30
η2 Shape parameter of the demand function – alternative calibration −0.28
γ1 Shape parameter of the demand function – baseline calibration 0.62
γ2 Shape parameter of the demand function – alternative calibration 0.67
ϕπ Monetary policy rule – weight on inﬂation stabilisation 1.5
ϕy Monetary policy rule – weight on output stabilisation 0.5
ρa Persistence of productivity shocks 0.95
σa Standard deviation of productivity shocks 0.45
ρu Persistence of demand shocks 0.97
σu Standard deviation of demand shocks 0.53
ρv Persistence of monetary policy shocks 0.15
σv Standard deviation of monetary policy shocks 0.24
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